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Abstract 
 
There is evidence that at an age of 6 months old, infants are able to at least interpret a simple 
goal-directed action as intentional. But there are still questions on how infants come to a goal-
directed interpretation of human actions. Therefore, we conducted two experiments, 
investigating the role of cues from the situation and from the actor’s behavior allowing infants 
to understand the goal-directedness of an action. More specifically, using the violation of 
expectations method, we examined how 6 and 9 months old infants interpret a simple action 
of a hand, which does not provide infants with any situational and behavioral cues. Therefore, 
we first familiarized infants with a reach and grasp movement of a hand towards a toy. This 
was followed by two test events: one in which the path of the hand was changed (to reach for 
the same object) and one in which the target object changed (either grasping a new object in 
Experiment 1 or stopping at the new object in Experiment 2). We found that infants of 9 
months old looked both longer to the new goal test event (Experiment 1) and no goal test 
event (Experiment 2) compared to the same goal test event (used in both experiments). This 
indicates they found both the reach and grasp of a new goal and the achievement of no goal at 
all more unexpected compared to achieving the same goal. Six months old infants however, 
only found it more unexpected when the hand did not achieve a goal anymore, but only when 
provided with additional situational cues (our control condition). This suggests a 
developmental shift in the role of cues from the actor and the situation for the interpretation of 
goal-directed actions of humans by infants. 
Keywords: infancy, goal-directed actions, violation of expectations paradigm, goal 
attribution 
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Introduction 
 
How do children develop an understanding of the world surrounding them? It is 
known from research that around 6 months, children have build up expectations about the 
behavior of other humans and understand that there is a goal underlying most of their actions 
(e.g. Woodward, 1998). However, we are still exploring which mechanisms account for the 
development of action understanding. Most researchers agree that this develops as a 
combination of an innate reasoning system and experience with goal-directed behavior 
through observation and infants’ own actions.  
 
Defining goal-directed behavior 
Before one can investigate how infants interpret, perceive and understand goal-
directed behavior, one must define goal-directed behavior in order to fully understand the 
implications of infants’ understanding of goal-directedness. Goal-directed behavior can 
simply be described as an action performed by an actor in a particular situation towards a 
specific end state. Goal-directed behavior of humans can also be seen as part of intentionality, 
in which the actor’s desires and intentions lead to (bodily) movement to achieve a particular 
goal (for example a specific object). Because their behavior is partly driven by their 
intentions, people are capable of deciding to perform a specific act in a particular manner. 
Thus, an action can be considered goal-directed or intentional if it can be viewed as a means 
to a particular end. 
Furthermore, humans are capable of automatically view most actions not as purely 
physical movements but as actions directed at and structured by goals. This perception of 
others’ action in terms of intentional relations (and thus drawing meanings from other’s 
behavior) is fundamental to human social life and functioning. Moreover, it can be seen as 
foundational for cognitive, linguistic and social development (Barresi & Moore, 1996; Gerson 
& Woodward, 2012). Actions are movements that are directed towards certain goals and that 
are performed to initiate desired changes in the environment (e.g., Elsner, 2007; Prinz, 1997). 
These actions consist of two observable elements: a movement part and a particular outcome 
of that movement. This outcome must have been intended by the actor, and therefore, both the 
action movement and action outcome are observable cues for the underlying goals of the 
action. However, there are still questions on how infants perceive, understand and interpret 
the actions of other persons. 
 
UNDERSTANDING GOAL-DIRECTED ACTIONS IN INFANCY 
- 5 - 
 
The origins of understanding goal-directed actions 
As mentioned before, goal-directed actions of humans can be seen as intentional, or 
representing in one’s mind what the goal is and what action is needed to achieve that goal. 
Therefore, the understanding of goal-directed actions  can be seen as a pre-cursor of later 
“theory of mind” abilities (e.g. Ascherleben, Hofer & Jovanovic, 2008; Gergely & Csibra, 
2003). Theory of mind can be seen as the understanding that other people also have mental 
states such as believes, desires, emotions and intentions and goals and that these may differ 
from own mental states (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra & Biro, 1995; Meltzoff, 1995). It is agreed 
infants show already precursors of this theory of mind, but there is still no clear answer to 
how and when infants come to an understanding of other one’s mind. Because more simple 
mental states like goals and intentions may be easier to understand, these may be particularly 
appropriate to investigate the early roots of theory of mind (Meltzoff, 1995). 
Piaget was one of the first describing the cognitive development of infants, including 
the understanding of goal-directed actions. According to Piaget (1952, 1954), young infants 
are now in the sensorimotor stage of development (from birth to 2 years), therefore they only 
get an understanding of the world in terms of their own overt, physical actions. Between 4 to 
8 months, infants are also observing the external world and learn how to perform certain 
actions in order to achieve an interesting effect (motor recognition). Therefore, they gradually 
develop an understanding of intentional behavior. Around 12 months, infants are able to 
interpret means-end action sequences as goal-directed behavior through their own experience 
and observation (Lightfoot, Cole & Cole, 2009; Miller, 2002). Piaget thus stated that infants 
begin life in a asocial manner and gradually develop an understanding of the similarities 
between themselves and others. He opined that the recognition of other ones behavior through 
infants’ own behavior is an outcome of the developing social cognition (e.g. Meltzoff, 2007; 
Piaget, 1952, 1954). 
Meltzoff (1995, 2007) extended Piaget’s work by stating a ‘like me’ framework of 
understanding other humans’ actions. Infants’ own motor activity does facilitate the early 
construction of knowledge. They recognize the behavior of others as representing their own 
behavior. Nine months old infants can understand other human actions by comparing them 
with their own actions. Thus, the ability to understand goal-directedness of others emerges 
from the ability to perform goal-directed actions themselves. However, other than Piaget, 
Meltzoff considered this ‘like me’ framework as the foundation of the developing social 
cognition of infants instead of the outcome. Social cognition develops through the perception 
of infants that others are ‘like me’. Therefore, they can use the self to understand actions and 
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goals of others and can learn about the possibilities and consequences of their own actions by 
observing others’ behavior (Meltzoff, 2007). 
Soon, other theorists like Woodward and Gergely & Csibra started to extend their 
findings, claiming infants are already able to understand the basis of goal-directed behavior 
before their first year of life. These researchers extensively investigated the origins of 
understanding goal-directed behavior. Both groups of theorists did this from a different point 
of view, especially on what critical mechanism underlies the understanding of goal-directed 
actions. Woodward (1998, 1999) was one of the first researchers able to demonstrate that 
infants already at 5 or 6 months old are able to interpret a human direct reach and grasping 
movement as goal-directed, but only when the action was familiar to them. Woodward 
initially supported Meltzoff’s  “like me” framework (2007), claiming that infants are able to 
interpret goal-directed behavior of other peoples due to their own experience. This experience 
emerges from infants’ own actions, thus their experience with performing goal-directed 
actions. Further, it develops from observing other people performing actions and thus 
imitating goal-directed behavior. Later, Woodward extended her view by stating that infants 
integrate different types and sources of information in order to perceive an observed action as 
goal-directed (Sommerville & Woodward, 2005; Woodward, 2009). For example, when 6 
months old infants are habituated to a hand reaching for one of two objects on a stage, they 
show longer looking times during test trials when the goal relation is disrupted (when the 
hand reaches for a new goal) but not when the physical relation is disrupted (the hand takes a 
new path to the same goal; Gerson & Woodward, 2012; Woodward, 1998). This paradigm by 
Woodward is still commonly used as a basis to extend her findings, especially to investigate 
the role of outcome selection information within the situation an action is embedded in. 
However, Gergely and Csibra investigated the perception of goal-directed actions by 
younger infants from another point of view (e.g. Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995). 
They proposed that infants for understanding goal-directed actions and intentionality can rely 
on an innate reasoning system. This understanding is an automatic process triggered by cues 
from both the actor and the action. According to their view, infants interpret human as well as 
nonhuman actions as goal-directed on the basis of the principle of rational action. They 
demonstrated that infants of 9 months old (and in later studies also from 6 months old; e.g. 
Csibra, 2008; Kamewari Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro & Hiraki, 2005) were able to infer that the 
movement of a ball was directed towards a goal. They based their idea on cues from the 
behavior of the ball, in this case the efficiency of its movement. Thus, according to them, 
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infants rely on cues to reason about whether the observed behavior is efficient and therefore 
goal-directed.  
 
Investigating infants’ understanding of goal-directed behavior 
A variety of methods have been used to test infants abilities in goal attribution, mostly 
relying on imitation (e.g. Meltzoff, 1995) and measures of visual attention (like preferential 
looking and violation of expectations). Especially the violation of expectations paradigm is 
used extensively, for example by Woodward (1998) and by Gergely and Csibra (Csibra & 
Gergely, 1998; Gergely and Csibra, 1994, 1997), providing us with evidence about the 
understanding of goal-directed actions in infancy. 
 
The violation of expectations paradigm.  
Initially, the looking time paradigm was used to examine the sensory capacities of 
infants by presenting them with a stimulus and observe their overt behavioral responses to it 
(in this case their looking behavior). Then, to determine if infants already have some 
preferences, researchers started to present two different stimuli at once to determine whether 
the infant had some preference by looking longer to one of the stimuli (the preferential 
looking paradigm; e.g. Spelke, 1985). Further, one can also present an infant with a complete 
new stimulus and continue presenting it until the infant looks away (gets bored). The next step 
is to change an aspect of the stimulus and explore if the infant’s interest is renewed after this 
change (and thus perceived the change; e.g. Friedman, 1972). This kind of measures of 
infants’ attention to stimuli can be used for understanding infants’ developmental processes 
like attention, perception and cognition (Lightfoot et al, 2009). 
To test infants’ higher level cognitive abilities, one commonly used method is based 
on the tendency of infants to stare at events that violate their expectations. First, infants are 
habituated or familiarized to a particular event and then presented with two variants of the 
event. If infants are capable of mentally representing their experiences, they should develop 
specific expectations during the familiarization phase and then look longer at events that 
violate those expectations. Infants’ developing representations is a joint consequence of 
evolutionary processes and experience (Hespos & Baillargeon, 2006; Wang, Baillargeon & 
Brueckner, 2004).  
This violation of expectations paradigm has been used extensively by developmental 
psychologists to gain insights into how infants represent properties of objects and how they 
come to understand the nature of causal relationships. The logic underlying this paradigm is 
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that individuals will look longer at events that are impossible or unexpected compared with 
events that are more consistent with their knowledge. In some sense they violate their 
knowledge of the world. 
 
Familiarization versus Habituation. 
As shortly mentioned, within the violation of expectations method  one can use either 
a habituation or familiarization procedure to introduce a new stimulus to infants. Within a 
habituation procedure, the goal is to establish a pattern of dishabituation in infants: a recovery 
of the looking times after a decline in looking times during the habituation phase. During the 
presentation of the same stimulus during the habituation, infants commonly show a decline in 
looking times. This may indicate infants have remembered the stimulus and therefore lose 
interest. When presenting a new stimulus to infants, they initially should look a long time but 
as the novelty of the stimulus was reduced, they should look less and less (this is called 
habituation). A child is considered habituated when showing a certain amount of decrease in 
looking time. When this criterion is reached, the novel stimuli are introduced (Slater, Morison 
& Rose, 1984). 
Within a familiarization procedure however, a stimulus is presented to the infant for a 
predetermined number of trials of a fixed duration. These presentations are not linked to the 
infant’s behavior or visual attention: it does not matter if the infants looks or not, the 
procedure will continue. However, a drawback of this procedure is that it is not certain 
whether an infant is totally habituated or totally processed the stimuli. Therefore, there may 
be a difference in processing levels between infants and one of the factors that may influence 
this difference is age. However, within a habituation procedure the trial length is defined by 
the looking of the infant: the trial begins when the infant looks at the screen and ends when he 
first looks away. Trials are repeatedly presented in the same way until the length of the 
infants’ look decreases below a certain criterion (Aslin, 2007; Bornstein, 1985; Pascalis & De 
Haan, 2003). However, it can be the case that infants does not meet the habituation criterion at 
all, and therefore you may have to exclude more participants then when using the 
familiarization procedure. It could be possible that other factors influenced the decline in 
looking times, for example fatigue or the attention span of infants. 
 
The role of the direct environment in infants’ action understanding 
Little research has yet focused on the role of environmental factors other than specific 
factors within a situation (like having a choice within a situation). However, one can imagine 
UNDERSTANDING GOAL-DIRECTED ACTIONS IN INFANCY 
- 9 - 
 
that stimulation from the environment is important to develop an understanding of the 
intentions of others. Infants develop this understanding also by observing goal-directed 
actions performed by parents and siblings. Social interaction with both siblings and parents 
shapes infants’ social and cognitive development, because through these interactions they 
may come to an understanding of the goals of other people by the combination of their actions 
and the results of that action (Barr & Hayne, 2003; Call & Carpenter, 2002; Dunn, 1989; 
Hohenberger et al., 2012).  
However, these goal-directed actions of others are embedded into a particular situation 
and humans tend to rely on information from that situation to interpret the observed action as 
goal-directed. This information comes both from the environment in which the action takes 
place and from the actor itself, the person who performs the action. From the environment, 
one can identify information about outcome selection, we infer that a particular outcome is the 
goal of an actor (and thus an expression of a preference for that object) by the availability of 
alternative outcomes. From the actor itself, one can infer he acts in a goal-directed way when 
he displays means selection, he is able to adjusts his action to the situational constraints in 
order to achieve his goal. Both kinds of information have been extensively studied using two 
different types of experimental paradigms (as mentioned before): The violation of 
expectations paradigm introduced by Woodward (1998) provides us with evidence for infants’ 
reliance on outcome selection information within the situation and another kind of violation of 
expectations paradigm originally developed by Gergely and Csibra (Csibra & Gergely, 1998; 
Gergely & Csibra, 1994, 1997) considers the importance of means selection by the actor. Both 
this planning behavior (based on selection between means) and preference within the situation 
(based on selection between outcomes) implies that the actor is making a choice regarding its 
actions. By investigating the fact that infants can connect these two aspects of choice making, 
one can support the idea that infants rely on this assumption in order to identify agents and to 
make sense of their behavior.  
 
Situational cues. 
When observing an action, infants rely on outcome selection information from the 
movement, this action expresses a clear choice of the agent between potential outcomes 
(Verschoor & Biro, 2011). As mentioned before, the paradigm introduced by Woodward 
(1998) gives evidence for this reliance on outcome selection information by infants as young 
as 6 months old to be able to infer a situation is goal-directed. Within this paradigm, infants 
are first habituated to an event in which an actor repeatedly acts upon one of two objects 
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present. Infants thus watch the actor consistently choosing one of two target objects. In the 
following test events, the location of the objects is switched. Therefore, the actor has to either 
reach for the same toy at a novel location or for the novel toy at the old location. Infants look 
longer in the other toy compared to the same toy event, this can be interpreted as evidence 
that infants are able to interpret the action as directed towards a particular goal/outcome. 
Therefore, infants seem to expect an actor to continue to direct his action towards the same 
target after something in the choice situation is altered.   
However, when there is no clear outcome selection information available, infants from 
5.5 months old and older seem to have difficulties interpreting the situation as goal-directed 
(Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). By presenting only one target object instead of two during the 
habituation/familiarization phase, thus giving no clear choice situation, infants seem to not 
build up expectations that the actor will reach to the same object when a new object is 
introduced during the test phase. Infants look equally long in the two test events, therefore it 
seems that they do not make goal-directed action predictions. This result may indicate that 
such  a simple action does not contain sufficient unambiguous means selection information to 
compensate for the lack of outcome selection information. Biro, Verschoor and Coenen 
(2011) also used one toy during the familiarization, but they added additional information 
about the means selection (thus the efficiency of the movement). They found that 12 months 
old infants were only able to interpret the situation as goal-directed when the means selection 
information was unambiguous. This is in line with and an extension of the findings reported 
by Luo and Baillargeon (2005). Before infants are 12 months old, they seem to rely at least at 
information from the situation to interpret a reach and grasp movement of a hand as goal-
directed. One toy target situations seem to be more ambiguous for infants and therefore more 
difficult to interpret. However, when presented with unambiguous behavioral cues in clear 
means selection towards the target toy, infants from 9 months old seem to be able to interpret 
this one toy versions as goal-directed (Biro et al., 2011; Hernick & Southgate, 2012).  
 
Behavioral cues. 
Biomechanical cues in the form of bodily movements such as manual acts (Biro, 
Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997), can give infants information that the 
behavior could be interpreted in psychological terms. Goal-directedness can be indicated by 
particular behaviors, which are called context-sensitive behavioral changes. These behaviors 
are characterized by adjustment to changes within the environment and by performing optimal 
and efficient actions towards certain means to an end (Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, & 
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Brockbank, 1999; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). These goal-directed actions have several 
characteristics: they act directly towards their goal (instead of acting in an indirect matter) and 
they can go around obstacles when encountering an initial obstacle (instead of just stopping 
there; Phillips & Wellman, 2005). 
Behavioral cues provide infants with specific means selection information, how the 
actor adjusts his action when presented with situational constraints in order to achieve a 
particular outcome (Csibra & Gergely, 1998; Gergely & Csibra, 1994, 1997). Infants are 
habituated to a situation in which there is only one outcome present, but the actor has to 
achieve this outcome by adjusting the action to a situational constraint present (in this case: 
approaching a target object by going around an obstacle). In the following test phase, the 
situational constraints are changed (the obstacle is removed) and the actor either adjusts his 
movement to the new situation or performs the same action. Infants looked longer when the 
actor did not adjust his movement to the new situation to make it more efficient within that 
particular situation compared to the other test event in which the behavior was efficiently 
adjusted. This implies that infants are able to understand the relation between the means and 
the goal of an actor. 
However, it seems to be important that the information about means selection is 
unambiguous in order to ensure that infants attribute goals to actions (Biro et al., 2007; 
Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely,  2003). For example, when the actor’s action seems not to be 
efficiently adjusted to the situational constraints during the habituation phase (when the actors 
takes a detour even when it is clear that a more direct and shorter route is available), infants 
do not develop specific expectations about the actor’s novel means to achieve the outcome. 
This also applies when the action does not show any adjustment due to a lack of situational 
constraints. 
Phillips and Wellmann (2005) extended the paradigm by Gergely et al. (1995) but 
replaced the ball with a human hand as actor. They found that 12 months old infants found it 
more unexpected if the hand did not make a direct reach movement (thus adjusted its means) 
towards the goal when the obstacle was removed but instead makes the same movement as 
when the obstacle was still present. Kamewari et al. (2005) also extended the paradigm by 
Gergely et al. (1995) by using a human actor, a humanoid robot and a box with no humanlike 
features. They were partly able to replicate their findings with 6.5 months old infants, 
suggesting that 6.5 months old infants are able to attribute goals to humans. These infants 
found it more unexpected when the human or humanoid robot were making the more 
inefficient movement but did not display this pattern when they saw a box making an 
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inefficient movement. However, this may have been due to the fact that the means towards 
achieving the end goal was not clear enough and therefore more unambiguous. Indeed, Csibra 
(2008) showed that 6.5 months old infants do attribute a goal to a movement of a box, but 
only if it varies its movement during the habituation phase thus providing richer cues for 
means selection. 
Also, by using the paradigm of Woodward (1998), the role of the efficiency of the 
means was investigated. However, the action was then performed by a human hand instead of 
an animated nonhuman agent. For example, Woodward and Sommerville (2000) found that 
12 months old infants only develop an expectation about a specific means action if this means 
earlier was causally and efficiently related to the goal of the action. Moreover, Biro and 
Verschoor (2007) found that both 7 and 9 months old infants were expecting the same goal to 
achieved but only if the means was efficiently related to the outcome. Therefore, infants seem 
to only consider the outcome of the goal-directed action if the means to an end was efficient.  
 
The current research 
As apparent from the results of the mentioned research, there is still some controversy 
about when infants are able to understand goal-directed actions. There is evidence that at an 
age of 6 months old, infants are able to at least interpret a simple goal-directed action (like a 
direct reach and grasp of a hand) as intentional. But not all research mentioned was able to 
replicate this finding by Woodward, suggesting that 6 months old infants are probably relying 
on specific cues to be able to attribute goals to actions. Thus, other factors (like observation) 
may play a more important role around this age then later in the development (as proposed by 
Hohenberger et al., 2012). Therefore, the goal of the current research is to gain more insight 
into the role of cues from the situation and cues from the actor’s behavior in allowing infants 
to understand the goal-directedness of an action. To examine this, infants were presented with 
a simple direct reach action of a human hand, which does not provide infants with any cues at 
all. Within the control condition, a situational cue was added to make sure infants are able to 
perceive both the original reaching action and action adjustment as goal-directed. 
Also, all previous mentioned research used either outcome selection information or 
means selection information (or a combination) to investigate how infants come to an 
understanding of goal-directed actions. Therefore, the current research is aimed at exploring 
how infants interpret a direct reach of a hand, presenting them with no additional information 
or cues. The way we tested this was by investigating their expectations using the violation of 
expectations method.  In this manner, we want to explore what infants expect when shown a 
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direct reach movement of a hand. Do they interpret a direct reach movement as directed to a 
particular goal or do they not even interpret a reach as goal-directed at all? 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In experiment 1, our aim was to investigate how infants interpret a goal-directed direct 
reach by a human hand. Do they interpret this action as performed to achieve a particular 
goal? We tested that by first familiarize the infants with a situation in which they observed a 
direct reach and grasp of an object. After this, we changed the situation by placing another 
object in front of the first object. This allowed us to investigate what infants would expect to 
happen in this situations based on the previous observed situation. For the new situation, there 
were two possible scenarios: The hand goes around the new object to grasp the same object as 
before (old goal) or the hand grasps the new object (new goal). We examined if there is a 
difference in what infants expect between an adjusted movement of a hand towards a familiar 
goal and a same movement of the hand towards a new goal. Do 6 and 9 months old infants, 
after observing a direct reach movement of a hand towards an object several times, expect the 
movement to be adjusted in order to achieve that same goal or do they expect to see the same 
movement resulting in a new goal?  
Within this experiment, participants are either assigned to an experimental condition 
or a control condition. In the experimental condition, there are no additional situational cues 
to interpret the situation as goal directed. In contrast, the control condition differs in a way 
that it is clearer from the situation that the hand’s behavior is goal directed. As mentioned 
before, from previous studies, it is already known that infants interpret a direct reach and 
grasp as goal directed when presented with a clear choice situation, when there was more than 
one target object available.  
There are several possible hypotheses regarding the looking behavior of the infants: 
1) Infants are able to interpret a direct reach situation as directed to achieve a particular 
goal only when presented with clear situational cues, thus when presented with a clear 
choice situation between two targets. They interpret a direct reach towards one target 
not as performed to achieve a particular goal. Thus, only infants within the control 
condition will display longer looking times when presented with the new goal event 
compared to the same goal event. Infants within the experimental condition will not 
show differences in looking times between both test events. 
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2) Infants are able to interpret a direct reach situation as directed to achieve a particular 
goal regardless of whether they are presented with clear situational cues (in this case a 
clear choice situation between targets). This results in longer looking times of infants 
during the new goal/same path test event compared to the same goal/new path test 
event in both test conditions. This suggests they are able to interpret this situation as 
goal-directed by expecting that the hand would grasp the same goal. 
Further, we want to explore if there are any developmental differences between the two 
age groups of 6 and 9 months old infants. The following hypotheses are taken into account: 
3) There is a difference between 6 and 9 months old infants in how they interpret a direct 
reach situation without any situational cues. Infants of 6 months old will interpret the 
direct reach as not directed to a particular goal, while 9 months old infants in fact do 
interpret the direct reach as goal-directed. Six months old infants within the control 
condition will show longer looking times during the new goal event compared to the 
same goal event. However, 6 months old infants within the experimental condition will 
not show this difference. For the 9 months old infant,  it will be the case that they will 
look longer at the new goal event compared to the same goal event, regardless of if 
they are assigned to the experimental or control condition. 
4) There are no differences between the two age groups, both 6 and 9 months old will not 
interpret a direct reach as goal-directed when they are not presented with any cues. 
When giving them additional cues (in this case a clear choice situation between two 
targets), they are able to interpret the direct reach as performed to achieve a particular 
goal. Thus, both 6 and 9 months old infants within the experimental condition will not 
look longer at the new goal event compared to the same goal event. However, infants 
within the control condition actually will show longer looking times during the new 
goal event compared to the same goal event. 
As mentioned earlier, this experiment consists of an experimental and a control condition. 
In the experimental condition, there is only one target toy present, thus giving the infant no 
additional situational cues. However, in previous studies infants were presented with a choice 
situation (e.g. Woodward, 1998), and all of these studies found that infants’ interpreted the 
action as goal-directed. Therefore, we added a control condition in which there is a choice 
present (by presenting 2 toys), expecting infants in the control condition will indeed attribute 
goals to the action. 
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Methods 
Participants 
In this first experiment, participants were twenty-seven 6 months old infants (Mage = 
27.93 weeks, SD = .92, Range = 4.73, 16 boys/11 girls). In addition, 1 infant was excluded 
due to not reaching the criterion for minimum looking time for the outcome of the test events 
(see procedure) and 1 infant was excluded due to procedural error. Also, thirty 9 months old 
participated (Mage = 39.49 weeks, SD = 1.21, Range = 4.56, 17 boys/13 girls). Additional, 5 
infants were excluded because they did not meet the outcome criterion and 1 infant was 
excluded due to procedural error. All participants of both age groups were randomly assigned 
to the experimental or the control group, leading to the following distribution of participants 
(see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Descriptives for the participants of Experiment 1. 
Age group N Nboys Ngirls Mage SD Range 
6 months Experimental condition 12 6 6 27.66 .89 3.02 
 Control condition 15 10 5 28.15 .91 3.59 
 TOTAL 27 16 11 27.93 .92 4.73 
9 months Experimental condition 15 8 7 39.04 1.16 4.16 
 Control condition 15 9 6 39.91 1.14 4.56 
 TOTAL 30 17 13 39.49 1.21 4.56 
 
All participants were recruited from Leiden and its surroundings. Parents were send 
some information about the Babylab of  Leiden University  and invited to register their baby. 
If parents were willing to participate with their infants in research conducted by the Babylab, 
they were asked to give some background information about their infant (name, date of birth, 
gender) as well as further contact information. When infants where approximately 6 or 9 
months old, we contacted parents by phone to invite them to participate in the current 
research. When they agreed to participate in this study, we sent them an e-mail with further 
information about the aim and procedure of the research and a confirmation of our 
appointment. Furthermore, this experiment is approved by the Ethical Committee for 
Psychological Research of the Leiden University. 
 
Stimuli 
In the experimental condition, infants were shown several video recordings (see Figure 
1). In the first pre-familiarization event, they are presented with a still image of 5 seconds 
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showing only 1 toy (a green plastic toy car) at the right side of the screen. After this, they see 
four identical familiarization events each starting with a still image of 2 seconds showing, in 
addition to the toy, a hand present at the left side of the screen. After 2 seconds, the hand 
makes a direct reach movement (with a duration of 5 seconds) and grasps the toy. Each 
familiarization event ends with a still image of the hand grasping the toy for 5 seconds. After 
showing the familiarization event four times, infants are shown a pre-test event of 5 seconds 
introducing a still image of a beige block standing in front of the toy.  
In the following test phase, we show infants 2 different test events. In the same 
goal/new path event, the event starts with a 2 seconds still image of a hand on the left side and 
the toy on the right side, and standing between them the same block. After 2 seconds, the 
hand first reaches straight (going towards the block) but then reaches around the block and 
grasps the same toy as in the familiarization. This reaching and grasping movement lasts for 5 
seconds, followed by a still image of the hand grasping the toy (with a maximum duration of 
60 seconds). The other test event presented to the infants is the new goal/same path event. 
This event starts identical, showing a still image of the hand and toy with a block between 
them. Then, the hand makes a direct reach movement of three seconds towards the block 
ending with grasping it (instead of going around it like during same goal/new path condition). 
This is followed by a still image of the hand grasping the block, this is shown with a 
maximum of 60 seconds. The order in which we show these test events is counterbalanced 
across the participants. In the control condition, all eight events are exactly the same except 
that instead of presenting the infants with only 1 toy, 2 toys (the green plastic toy car and a 
brown soft toy dog) are present now at the right side of the screen (see Figure 1). 
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EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION CONTROL CONDITION 
Familiarization phase Familiarization phase 
1 pre-familiarization event 
 
 
 
 
 
1 pre-familiarization event 
 
 
 
 
 
2-5 familiarization event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2-5 familiarization event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 pre-test event 
 
 
 
 
 
6 pre-test event 
 
 
 
 
 
Test phase Test phase 
1 same goal/new path event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 same goal/new path event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 new goal/old path event 
 
 
 
 
 
2 new goal/old path event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of all events in both the experimental and control condition of Experiment 1. 
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Apparatus 
All videos were shown on a 31-inch TV screen placed into a filming booth. This booth 
stands inside the Babylab of Leiden University and can be isolated from the rest of the room 
using a dark curtain. Infants sit on their parents lap in front of the TV screen with 
approximately 70 centimeters distance. Recordings are made of both the TV screen and the 
infants’ face using two separate camera’s. A split image can be created in order to see both 
the videos and the infant’s face at the same time. 
The experiment is running using a special designed Looking Time Program (Schrama 
& Biro, 2005). This program is both used for controlling the stimulus presentation and for 
measuring the looking time of the infant. For the familiarization part, the experimenter starts 
every event by pressing a button. During the test phase, the experimenter can directly measure 
the looking time of the infant by pressing a key. A computer program calculated the specific 
looking times for both test events.  
 
Testing procedure 
First, parent and infant are welcomed in the Babylab and introduced with the testing 
procedure. After this introduction, the parent is asked to fill in an informed consent and then 
the experiment could start. Parents were also told that they could always stop the experiment, 
for example when their infant started to cry or was fussy. Parent and infant were seated inside 
the special filming booth and the experimenter moved the camera to make sure the infants’ 
face is recorded clearly. Then, the curtain is closed and the presentation of the video 
recordings of the events could be started. If the infant was not looking, the experimenter uses 
a bell sound to attract the attention of the infant towards the TV screen. During 
familiarization, this bell sound can be used several times to make sure the infant perceived the 
complete situation. After the familiarization phase, the parent is asked to close her eyes before 
the experiment continues with the test phase. This specific instruction is given to avoid any 
distraction or influence from the parent. Before showing each test event, the same bell sound 
is used. The experimenter starts directly at the beginning of each test video with measuring 
the looking time of the infant simply by pressing or releasing a button on the computer. After 
finishing the second test event as well, each infant received a diploma and a small gift to 
thank them for their participation. 
The criteria used for measuring the looking time during the test events are the 
following: the event still continues if the infant does not look away for more than 2 seconds; 
however, when the infants looked less than 5 seconds, the trial was ignored and started again 
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(this is the minimum time to ensure the infants saw the complete movement of the hand); 
when infants looked longer than 60 seconds, the test trial stopped and a new one begun (or the 
experiment was ended). Looking times are both measured online and measured by a second 
coder. Also, looking times for the familiarization phase are measured offline using the same 
looking time program. Finally, an outcome measure is created by measuring looking times for 
both test events from the point at which the actors’ hand reaches for the toy or the block. This 
special outcome measure is created because the time-path of the hand movement differs 
between the two test events. To rule out differences in looking time due to a difference in 
duration of the actual movie, this measure was included in the further analysis. To assess the 
reliability of the online coding of the looking times, a second coder recoded the test events 
offline. The inter-coder reliability between the online and offline measurements of the total 
looking time during the test events was measured using Cronbach’s alpha. The reliability was 
 = .87.     
Results 
Looking times during the familiarization phase 
First, we tested if there were any differences in the looking times of the infants during 
the familiarization phase between the experimental and the control condition for both age 
groups using a multivariate analysis of variances (MANOVA). We looked at the looking 
times for the pre-familiarization event, the mean looking time for the four identical 
familiarization events and the looking times during the pre-test event.  The between-subjects 
factors taken into account are age group (6 or 9 months) and test condition (experimental or 
control condition). Between the two test conditions, there are no significant differences for the 
3 measures of looking time (pre-familiarization: F(1,46) = .09, p = .77; mean familiarization: 
F(1,46) = 1.69, p = .2; pre-test: F(1,46) = .32, p = .57). Also, there is no significant main 
effect for age group (pre-familiarization: F(1,46) = .19, p = .66; mean familiarization: F(1,46) 
= 3.89, p = .055; pre-test: F(1,46) = .1, p = .75), but there can be seen a tendency towards a 
difference in the mean looking times of the four familiarization events: 9 months old infants 
tend to look longer than 6 months old infants (9 months: M = 9.37 seconds; 6 months: M = 
8.18 seconds). Furthermore, there is no significant interaction effect between age group and 
test condition (pre-familiarization: F(1,46) = 1, p = .32; mean familiarization: F(1,46) = .35, p 
= .56; pre-test: F(1,46) = .09, p = .56). Thus, there are no significant differences in looking 
time during the familiarization phase between infants within the experimental and control 
condition of both 6 and 9 months old. 
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Furthermore, we tested whether there could be found a decline in the looking times of 
the participants during the four separate familiarization events for both age groups using a 
repeated measures MANOVA with looking times for the four familiarization events as 
within-factor and age group and test condition as between-factors. First, there is a significant 
main effect for familiarization (F(3,138) = 5.51, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .11), in which the mean 
looking time during familiarization declines significantly from 9.6 seconds during the first 
event to 8.29 seconds during the fourth event. Further, there is a tendency towards a 
difference between the two age groups (F(1,46) = 3.89, p = .055, ηp
2 
= .08). For test condition, 
there is no significant main effect (F(1,46) = 1.69, p = .2, ηp
2 
= .04). Also, there are no 
significant interaction effects between familiarization and age group (F(3,138) = .14, p = .94, 
ηp
2
= .003), familiarization and test condition (F(3,138) = 1.24, p = .0297, ηp
2 
= .03), age group 
and test condition (F(1,46) = .35, p = .56, ηp
2 
= .01) and  familiarization, age group and test 
condition (F(3,138) = .49, p = .69, ηp
2 
= .01). In sum, this means that the mean looking time 
during all familiarization events declines, regardless of the test condition and this is the case 
for both age groups. But, 9 months old infants tend to look longer during the familiarization 
events compared to the 6 months old infants (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean looking times in seconds during the familiarization phase. 
 
Looking times during the test phase 
For analyzing the test events, we were interested to see whether there were differences 
in looking time patterns between the two age groups, taken into account several other factors 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
M
ea
n
 l
o
o
k
in
g
 t
im
e 
fa
m
il
ia
ri
za
ti
o
n
 (
se
c)
 
experimental condition 
(6 months) 
control condition 
(6 months) 
experimental condition 
(9 months) 
control condition 
(9 months) 
UNDERSTANDING GOAL-DIRECTED ACTIONS IN INFANCY 
- 21 - 
 
like test condition and test order. Because gender did not had any main or interaction effects, 
we omitted this factor from further analyses. 
 
Looking times for 6 months old infants. 
First, we explored whether there were any differences in the mean looking times 
during the test events for the 6 months old participants using a repeated measures MANOVA. 
The within-subject factor consisted of the outcome measures of both test events (consisting of 
looking time in seconds), the between-subject factors were test condition (experimental or 
control condition) and test order (same goal event first or new goal event first). There are no 
significant main effects for test event (F(1,23) = .01, p = .92, ηp
2
= .001), test condition 
(F(1,23) = .09, p = .77, ηp
2 
= .004) and test order (F(1,23) = .31, p = .58, ηp
2 
= .01). Also, 
there are no further interaction effects found between test condition and test event (F(1,23) = 
.69, p = .41, ηp
2 
= .03), test order and test event (F(1,23) = .53, p = .48, ηp
2 
= .02), test 
condition and test order (F(1,23) = .23, p = .63, ηp
2 
= .01) and of test event, test condition and 
test order (F(1,23) = .26, p = .62, ηp
2 
= .01). In sum, this means that 6 months old infants did 
not look significantly longer at the new goal/same path test event than at the same goal/new 
path event. This was the case for both the experimental and control condition and test order 
did not make any difference (see also Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Mean looking times in seconds during the test phase for both age groups and test 
conditions. 
 
Looking times for 9 months old infants. 
For the 9 months old infants, we also used a repeated measures MANOVA with the 
outcome measure of both test events for the 9 months old infants as the within-subjects factor 
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and with test condition and test order as between-subjects factors. There was a significant 
main effect for test event (F(1,26) = 4.35, p = .047, ηp
2 
= .14), infants looked significantly 
longer at the new goal/same path condition (M = 11.19 seconds) compared to the same 
goal/new path condition (M = 8.01 seconds). Furthermore, the main effect of test condition 
was not significant (F(1,26) = .02, p = .88, ηp
2 
= .001) neither was the main effect of test order 
(F(1,26) = .098, p = .76, ηp
2 
= .004). There were not found any significant interaction effects 
between test event and test condition (F(1,26) = .66, p = .43, ηp
2 
= .03), test event and test 
order (F(1,26) = 1.77, p = .2, ηp
2 
= .06), test order and test condition (F(1,26) = 2.31, p = .14, 
ηp
2 
= .08) and between test event, test order and test condition (F(1,26) = .77, p = .39, ηp
2 
= 
.03). These results indicate that 9 months old infants looked significantly longer at the new 
goal/same path test event compared to the same goal/new path condition regardless of the test 
condition or test order (see also Figure 3). 
Conclusion 
We investigated whether 6 and 9 months old infants interpret a direct reach as goal-
directed. Our results are partly in line with our third hypothesis, stating that there is a 
difference in how 6 and 9 months old infants interpret a direct reach situation. We expected to 
find that 6 months old infants looked longer to the new goal test event compared to the same 
goal test event, but only when provided with additional situational cues (in a choice situation 
between two target objects). In addition, we hypothesized that the 9 months old infants would 
display longer looking times for the new goal test event than the same goal test event, 
regardless of adding situational cues. 
For the 6 months old infants however, there was no difference in looking times 
between the test events in none of the test conditions. This means that they did not find it 
more unexpected that the direct reach had a new outcome compared to  achieve the same 
outcome and this was the case for both the experimental and control condition. Thus, for the 6 
months old infants it did not matter if they were provided with additional situational cues with 
regard to how they interpreted the direct reach. When presented with a clear choice situation 
between targets, they generated no further expectations about the hand reaching for a 
particular goal. This can indicate they found both test events equally unexpected, therefore 
they showed no differences in looking times between the two test events. It can also be the 
case that they need more cues to interpret the situation as goal-directed, for example further 
behavioral cues or more additional situational cues. Another possibility is they simply did not 
interpret the situation as goal-directed at all, they do not perceive a direct reach as directed to 
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a particular goal. This in contrast to earlier findings by Woodward (1998, 1999). Therefore, 
we conducted a second experiment to investigate whether infants would expect a direct reach 
of a hand to achieve a goal and thus find it more unexpected when the hand seems to and his 
movement without achieving any goal at all. 
The 9 months old infants did actually show differences in their looking behavior 
between the two test events: They looked longer in the new goal test event compared to the 
same goal test event. Surprisingly, this was the case in both the experimental and control 
condition, indicating they did not need to rely on additional situational cues to interpret the 
direct reach as performed to achieve a certain goal. This raises questions about on what kind 
of information they rely on to interpret an action of a hand as goal-directed. Therefore, a 
second experiment was conducted.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 1, we found that there is a difference in how infants of 6 and 9 months 
old interpreted the direct reach situation. Six months old infants seemed to interpret the direct 
reach as not aimed at a particular goal. This raises the question whether it is possible that 
infants have difficulties with perceiving that there is any goal at all? In order to investigate 
this question, we conducted a second experiment. Within this experiment, we included a test 
event in which the hand stops at the first object on its direct path (without grasping any 
object) and thus does not achieve a goal at all. Do infants interpret the direct reach and grasp 
of a hand as goal-directed at all? Would it therefore be more unexpected for them to see a 
direct reach without achieving any goal compared to a direct reach performed to achieve a 
particular goal? 
There are several possible hypotheses regarding the looking behavior of the infants: 
1) Infants are able to interpret a direct reach situation as goal-directed even when they are 
not presented with clear situational cues (in this case a clear choice situation between 
targets). When presented with a direct reach which seems to end without achieving 
any goal at all, they find this more unexpected because they expected the hand to 
perform the direct reach to achieve a goal. This results in longer looking times of 
infants during the no goal/same path test event compared to the same goal/new path 
test event, suggesting they are able to interpret this situation as goal-directed by 
expecting that the hand would grasp the same goal. Further, we expect this to be the 
case for both the experimental and control condition. 
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2) Infants are able to interpret a direct reach situation as goal-directed only when 
presented with clear situational cues, thus when presented with a clear choice situation 
between two targets. They interpret a direct reach towards one target not as performed 
to achieve a goal and thus are not more surprised when the direct reach movement 
seems to end without achieving any goal at all. Thus, only children within the control 
condition will display longer looking times when presented with the no goal event 
compared to the same goal event. Children within the experimental condition will not 
show differences in looking times between both test events. 
Further, we want to explore if there can be found any developmental differences between 
the two age groups of 6 and 9 months old infants. The following hypotheses are possible: 
3) There is a difference between 6 and 9 months old infants in how they interpret a direct 
reach situation without any situational cues. Infants of 6 months old will interpret the 
direct reach as not directed to a goal, while infants of 9 months old in fact do interpret 
the direct reach as goal-directed. Six  months old infants within the control condition 
will show longer looking times during the no goal event compared to the same goal 
event, but 6 months old within the experimental condition will not show this 
difference. For the 9 months old it will be the case that they will look longer at the no 
goal event compared to the same goal event, regardless of if they are assigned to the 
experimental or control condition. 
4) There can be found no differences between the two age groups, both 6 and 9 months 
old will interpret the direct reach situation as goal-directed event when they are not 
presented with a clear choice situation. In this case, both 6 and 9 months old infants 
will display longer looking times during the no goal event compared to the looking 
times during the same goal event and this will be the case for infants in both the 
experimental and the control condition. 
Methods 
Participants 
In this second experiment, twenty-seven 6 months old infants participated (Mage = 
27.67 weeks, SD = .71, Range = 2.73, 16 boys/11 girls). One additional infant was excluded 
because of not meeting the outcome criterion (see procedure Experiment 1). Also, thirty-two 9 
month olds participated (Mage = 40.21 weeks, SD = 1.28, Range = 5.59, 16 boys/16 girls). In 
addition, 2 infants were excluded due to not reaching the outcome criterion. The same as in 
experiment 1, all participants came from Leiden and its surroundings. The procedure used to 
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recruit the parents and infants is the same as described in Experiment 1. Infants were 
randomly assigned to either an experimental or a control group, leading to the following 
distribution displayed in Table 2. 
  
Table 2 
Descriptives for the participants of Experiment 2. 
Age group N Nboys Ngirls Mage SD Range 
6 months Experimental condition 16 11 5 27.57 .74 2.29 
 Control condition 11 5 6 27.8 .68 2.29 
 TOTAL 27 16 11 27.67 .71 2.73 
9 months Experimental condition 17 9 8 40.1 1.59 5.58 
 Control condition 15 7 8 40.36 .84 3.55 
 TOTAL 32 16 16 40.21 1.28 5.59 
 
Stimuli 
The design of Experiment 2 is identical to the design of Experiment 1: Infants were 
assigned either to the experimental or control condition, both consisting of a familiarization 
phase and a test phase (see Figure 3). Within the experimental condition, the stimuli shown 
during the familiarization phase are exactly the same as the ones used in Experiment 1. 
However,  the stimuli of the test phase differ from the stimuli used in Experiment 1. There are 
two test events: the same goal/new path condition is identical to the same event in experiment 
1, showing a direct reach movement of a hand towards the toy, while going around the block 
between them. The other test event is the no goal/same path event. During this test event, 
infants first see a still image of two seconds showing the hand on the left side and the toy on 
the right side with between them a block. After this still image, the hand moves with a direct 
reach towards the block and just stops there after 3 seconds. The event then continues with 
showing a still image of the hand in front of the block with behind the block the toy. This still 
image lasts for a maximum of 60 seconds. Infants saw both test events, only the order differed 
for half of them. Infants assigned to the control condition saw exactly the same events, the 
only difference was that there are 2 toys present at the right side of the screen instead of 1 toy. 
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EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION CONTROL CONDITION 
Familiarization phase Familiarization phase 
1 pre-familiarization event 
 
 
 
 
 
1 pre-familiarization event 
 
 
 
 
 
2-5 familiarization event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2-5 familiarization event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 pre-test event 
 
 
 
 
 
6 pre-test event 
 
 
 
 
Test phase Test phase 
7 same goal/new path event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 same goal/new path event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 no goal/old path event 
 
 
 
 
 
8 no goal/old path event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Overview of all events in both the experimental and control condition of Experiment 2. 
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Apparatus & Test Procedure 
The apparatus and test procedure are identical to the ones used in Experiment 1. As in 
Experiment 1, the inter-coder reliability is assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha (  = .9). 
Results 
Looking times during familiarization phase 
As in Experiment 1, we first tested if there are differences in the looking times of the 
familiarization phase between the experimental and control condition and between the two 
age groups using a MANOVA. For test condition, no significant main effect was found for the 
pre-familiarization event (F(1,49) = .098, p = .76) and the mean of the four familiarization 
events (F(1,49) = .22, p = .64). But, there is a tendency towards a difference in looking times 
during the pre-test event (F(1,49) = 3.9, p = .053). Infants assigned to the experimental 
condition looked longer to the pre-test event (M = 4.2 seconds) than infants within the control 
condition (M = 3.54 seconds). Also, there was a significant main effect of age group for the 
mean looking times during the four familiarization events (F(1,49) = 8.4, p = .01). Six months 
old participants looked shorter during these events than 9 months old infants did (6 months: M 
= 8.07 seconds; 9 months: M = 9.89 seconds). This main effect of age group did not apply to 
the pre-familiarization (F(1,49) = .001, p = .98) and the pre-test (F(1,49) = 1.31, p = .26) 
Furthermore, no significant interaction effect  was found between test condition and age (pre-
familiarization: F(1,49) = .08, p = .78; mean familiarization: F(1,49) = .07, p = .79; pre-test: 
F(1,49) = .86,  p = .36). In sum, this means that there are some small differences between the 
infants during the familiarization phase.  
Also, we wanted to test if there was a decline in looking time during the actual 
familiarization events using a repeated measures MANOVA. There is a significant main 
effect for the familiarization (F(3,150) = 11.94, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .13) with a decline in mean 
looking time from 9.99 seconds during the first event to 8.58 seconds during the fourth event. 
Also, there is a significant main effect for age group (F(1,50) = 9.26, p = .004, ηp
2 
= .16), 9 
months old infants looked significantly longer  to the events than the 6 months old infants ( 9 
months: M =  9.97 seconds; 6 months: M = 8.07 seconds). For test condition, there was no 
significant main effect (F(1,50) = .36, p = .55, ηp
2 
= .01). Further, there are no significant 
interaction effects between familiarization and age group (F(3,150) = 1.69, p = .18, ηp
2 
= .03), 
familiarization and test condition (F(3,150) = 3.12, p = .08, ηp
2 
= .06) and familiarization, age 
group and test condition (F(3,150) = .22, p = .64, ηp
2 
= .004). The interaction effect between 
age group and test condition was also not significant (F(1,50) = .02, p = .9, ηp
2 
= .02). This 
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means that there is a decline in the looking times during the four separate familiarization 
events, despite of the test condition for both age groups. However, the 9 months old infants 
showed overall longer looking times during the familiarization events compared to the 6 
months old infants (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Mean looking times during the familiarization phase. 
 
Looking times during the test phase 
As in Experiment 1, preliminary analyses revealed that there were no significant 
effects of gender. Therefore, we decided (as in Experiment 1) to omit gender as between-
subjects factor in the further analyses. 
 
Looking times for 6 months old infants. 
We tested differences in looking times during the test phase for 6 months old infants 
using a repeated measures MANOVA, with the outcome measure for the two test events as 
within-subjects factor and test condition and test order as between-subjects factors. We did 
find a significant main effect for test event (F(1,23) = 4.66, p = .04, ηp
2 
= .17), indicating that 
6 month olds looked significantly longer at the no goal/same path test event compared to the 
same goal/new path test event (Figure 6). Also, there was a significant main effect of test 
order (F(1,23) = 6.48, p = .02, ηp
2 
= .22), indicating that the infants looked significantly 
longer when the no goal/same path condition was shown first (M = 18.71 seconds, SD = 3.52), 
than when they were first presented with the same goal/new path condition (M = 6.99 
seconds, SD = 2.97). Furthermore, there was no significant main effect of test condition 
(F(1,23) = .08, p = .78, ηp
2 
= .003) and there were no significant interaction effects between 
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test event and test condition (F(1,23) = 3.08, p = .09, ηp
2 
= .12), test event and test order 
(F(1,23) = 3.79, p = .06, ηp
2 
= .14) and test condition and test order (F(1,23) = .07, p = .8, ηp
2 
= .003). However, a significant interaction effect between test condition, test order and test 
event was found (F(1,23) = 12.33, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .37).  
To further investigate this three-way interaction effect, we investigated the effects of 
test event and test order separately for the experimental and control condition. Within the 
experimental condition, there were no significant main effects and interaction effects for test 
event and test order (all with a p-value of  < 0.14). Within the control condition however, 
there is a significant main effect of both test event (F(1,9) = 6.49, p = .03, ηp
2 
= .42) and test 
order (F(1,9) = 6.78, p = .03, ηp
2 
= .43) and a significant interaction effect between test event 
and test order (F(1,9) = 13.28, p = .005, ηp
2 
= .596). As shown by further t-tests, infants 
looked significantly longer to the no goal test event compared to the same goal event, but only 
when the no goal test event was shown first (t(9) = -3.46, p = .007; see also Figure 7). In sum, 
this indicates that only 6 months old infants within the experimental condition looked 
significantly longer to the no goal test event than the same goal test event, but only when this 
was presented first (thus before the same goal test event). Infants within the experimental 
condition however did not display looking time differences between the two test events. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean looking times in seconds during the test phase for both age groups and test 
conditions. 
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Looking times for 9 months old infants. 
Differences in looking times during the two test events between 9 months old infants 
were tested with a repeated measures MANOVA, with the outcome measure for both test 
events as within-subjects factor and test condition and test order as between-subjects factors. 
We found a significant main effect for test event (F(1,28)=4.49, p=.04, ηp
2
=.14), the mean 
looking time during the no goal/same path condition was 12.46 seconds and thus significantly 
higher than the mean looking time during the same goal/new path condition (M = 8.89 
seconds). Further, there are no significant main effects of test condition (F(1,28)=.27, p=.61, 
ηp
2
=.01) and test order (F(1,28)=1.49, p=.23, ηp
2
=.05). Also, there were no interaction effects 
of test event and test condition (F(1,28)=.07, p=.8, ηp
2
=.002), test event and test order 
(F(1,28)=.31, p=.58, ηp
2
=.01), test condition and test order (F(1,28)=.53, p=.47, ηp
2
=.02) and 
test event with test condition and test order (F(1,28)=.03, p=.86, ηp
2
=.001) In sum, this means 
that 9 months old infants looked significantly longer at the no goal/same path condition, 
despite of test condition and test order (see also Figure 6). 
Conclusion 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to examine whether 6 and 9 months old infants would 
interpret a direct reach as goal-directed and therefore find it more unexpected when the direct 
reach seems to end without reaching any goal at all compared to when the direct reach was 
aimed at achieving a particular goal. For both age groups, it was the case that they looked 
longer when the hand just stopped at the new object in front of the toy compared to when the 
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Figure 7. Mean looking times in seconds during the test phase for the control condition of 6 months old 
infants by test order. 
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hand reached and grasped the same goal. This indicates that around 9 months, infants are 
already able to interpret a simple direct reach as goal-directed in general. Furthermore, they 
do not need to rely on any situational cues.. This may indicate that they always assume that a 
hand movement is goal-directed, thus the features of the hand takes over the behavioral cues.  
For 6 months old infants however, the relation is somewhat more complicated, 
suggesting there are indeed developmental differences. Six months old infants looked 
significantly longer when the no goal/same path event was shown first to them and when 
presented with additional situational cues (in 2 toys present).  
 These findings are in line with our third hypothesis, in which we expected to find a 
difference between the two age groups in how they interpret a goal-directed action.  
 
General discussion 
 
Both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were conducted in order to investigate the role 
of behavioral and situational cues in interpreting a direct reach as goal-directed by infants. 
When combining the results, there can be seen different patterns among the age groups of 6 
and 9 months old infants. Nine months old infants do in fact interpret a direct reach as goal-
directed in general. They seem to find it more unexpected when the hand does not reach a 
goal at all. Further, they also expect a direct reach movement to be directed at a particular 
goal and therefore find it more unexpected when the hand grasps instead of that particular 
goal a new goal. This interpretation pattern did not seem to differ between the experimental 
and control condition, thus infants did not need to rely on the provided situational cues, they 
still interpreted the situation the same when not presented with a clear choice situation.  
However, based on previous research (e.g. Luo & Baillargeon, 2005), we expected to 
find that 9 months old infants would rely on additional situational cues to be able to interpret 
both the new goal and no goal test events as unexpected in the light of goal-directed behavior 
of the hand. Thus, we expected that only infants within the control condition would display 
longer looking times within the new goal and no goal test events compared to the same goal 
test event. But, despite of our expectations, both infants within the experimental and control 
condition looked longer to those test events than to the same goal test event. This may 
indicate that infants did not need to rely on additional situational cues to interpret the situation 
as goal-directed. For their interpretation, they used other information or cues than the choice 
possibility between two possible target objects. Biro and Verschoor (2007) for example found 
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that infants of this age only expected the same outcome to be achieved when the means was 
efficiently related to the outcome. Another possible explanation is that 9 months old infants 
rely on featural cues from the actor to infer that its movement is goal-directed. It is possible 
they already categorized a hand movement as goal-directed and therefore expect the hand 
always to act to achieve a goal (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Csibra, 2008; Kamewari et al., 2005). 
For example, Kamewari et al. (2005) did demonstrate that infants attribute goals in the 
absence of behavioral cues when the agent is part of or looks like a familiar actor category (a 
human or a humanoid robot). Thus, featural identiﬁcation of actors can have influence on goal 
attribution in early infancy. 
For the 6 months old infants however, we revealed another pattern in looking times 
during Experiment 1 and 2, suggesting there are some developmental differences between the 
two age groups. First, 6 months old infants seemed not to expect the hand movement to be 
directed towards the same goal, even not when they were presented with a choice situation 
(Experiment 1). This suggests that maybe they had difficulties with the novelty of both test 
events. We were not able to replicate the findings by Woodward (1998): she found that 6 
months old infants could recognize a direct reach as directed towards a particular goal when 
there was a clear choice situation present. Maybe the situation was too confusing or 
demanding for them and they would have needed more familiarization trials. Another 
possibility is that the situation was too complicated because the hand did choose the new 
obstacle as goal, maybe they build up other expectations and therefore found both test event 
equally unexpected. Another possibility is that they needed more clear behavioral cues to rely 
on for interpreting the situation: why is the hand now grasping the first object on its way and 
not its initial goal object? Within the first series of movies during the familiarization, one 
could see the hand making a direct reach action towards a target object several times. 
Therefore, one could expect that this object is the goal of the hand. When a new object is 
introduced standing in front of the other object, maybe it is more natural to expect the hand to 
just remove the new object in order to achieve the same goal (and thus expect an action 
sequence of goal-directed behavior; Verschoor & Biro, 2011). According to Verschoor and 
Biro (2011), young infants can evaluate the causal efficiency of a sub action, leading to an 
overarching goal. Possibly, it was the case that 6 months old infants expected a more familiar 
action and thus thought that the grasping of the object was just part of a behavioral sequence 
and therefore assumed that the hand just did not finished its movement. This is more in line 
with the findings of Woodward (1998), because when 6 months old infants where confronted 
with an action they were not familiar with (like reaching for a target object but instead of 
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grasping it touching it with the back of a hand), they also did not display looking time 
differences between touching the original object and touching the other object.  
Familiarity with a hand (and more specifically a reaching and grasping movement of a 
hand) may also play a role in the findings for the 6 months old infants in Experiment 2. We 
found that only infants within the control condition looked significantly longer to the no goal-
same path event compared to the same goal-new path event, but only when the no goal event 
was shown first to them. First, this may indicate that 6 months old infants do rely on 
situational cues in order to be able to interpret a simple reaching action as goal-directed. They 
had difficulties interpreting the reaching movement as goal-directed when there was no clear 
choice situation present, but this altered when we provided them with a choice for the actor. 
In this case, they found it more unexpected when the hand just stops at the new object in front 
of the 2 toys compared to when the hand showed a clear choice for one of the 2 toys. This is 
in line with other findings, suggesting that such a simple action may not contain sufficient 
unambiguous means selection information (e.g. Luo & Baillargeon, 2005).  
The order in which infants were presented with the test events also played a role. Six 
months old infants within Experiment 2 only displayed longer looking times for the no goal 
event when this event was presented first to them. When they first saw the same goal event, 
they did not display this differences in looking times between both test events. Similar 
patterns are sometimes reported, for example Csibra et al. (2003) found that both 6 and 9 
months old infants looked longer to the no obstacle event but only when this was presented 
first to them. Other research also revealed the influence of the presentation order of the test 
events on infants’ looking times in infants of 12 months old (Csibra et al., 1999; Csibra et al., 
2003, Hohenberger et al., 2012). A possible explanation lies in the break between the 
familiarization phase and the test phase, this may have facilitated a recovery of the interest for 
both of the test stimuli. Also, the degree of perceptual dissimilarity of the first test event 
showed compared to the pre-test event may have caused infants to look longer to the first test 
event they see. Due to showing them the first test event, this degree of perceptual dissimilarity 
declines, which is also a possible explanation for infants’ shorter looking times during the 
second test event. 
Another possibility is that the delay between the familiarization phase and test phase 
(caused by giving the parent new instructions to close their eyes), was too long and therefore 
infants did not represent the situation properly anymore. A developmental growth in the 
capacity of representing can be found: Young infants are capable of representing objects they 
cannot see but quickly forget their location. The younger the infant, the shorter this delay 
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must be in order to make infants able to remember where the object was placed within the 
situation (Lightfoot, Cole & Cole, 2009). In that case, they may have profited from using 
habituation instead or using more familiarization trials (Bornstein, 1985; Pascalis & De Haan, 
2003).  
Turning back to the possible influence of familiarity for both the interpretation of both 
6 and 9 months old, one can also consider the influence of the direct environment of young 
infants on how they perceive, understand and interpret goal-directed actions. Little research 
has yet focused on the role of environmental factors other than specific factors within a 
situation (like having a choice within a situation). However, one can imagine that stimulation 
from the environment is important in order to develop an understanding of the intentions of 
others. Infants develop this understanding also by observing goal-directed actions performed 
by parents and siblings. Social interaction with both siblings and parents shapes infants’ social 
and cognitive development, because through these interactions they may come to an 
understanding of the goals of other people by the combination of their actions and the results 
of these actions (Barr & Hayne, 2003; Call & Carpenter, 2002; Dunn, 1989). Recently, a 
series of studies by Hofer and colleagues (Hofer, 2005; Hofer, Hohenberger, & Ascherleben, 
2008; Hohenberger et al, 2012) provided the first evidence for the specific role of mother-
infant interactions and the understanding of goal-directed actions by infants. Hofer et al. 
(2008) used a modified version of the Woodward paradigm (1998) to assess understanding of 
goal-directed actions by 6 months old infants and the CARE-index to assess maternal 
interaction styles. Infants were first familiarized with a goal-directed hand action towards one 
of two objects, followed by two types of test events: the path change event in which the hand 
adjusts its path to achieve the same goal and the object change event in which the hand 
follows the same path but contacts the other object. They found that infants with modestly 
controlling mothers are better at interpreting human goal-directed actions, they looked longer 
at the path change test event compared to the object change test event. This indicates that 
infants already are able to encode the action as goal-directed. Interestingly, they were not able 
to replicate the findings of Woodward (1998), not the whole group of 6 months old infants 
were able to interpret the hand action as directed towards a particular goal, only infants of 
modestly controlling mothers did perceive the direct reach as goal-directed. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that moderate controlling mothers structure their interactions 
more strongly, introduce new objects earlier and more frequently.  
Extending this results, Hohenberger et al. (2012) explored this relationship in both 6 
and 10 months old infants by using the same tasks. They found the same pattern as did Hofer 
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et al (2008) in 6 months old infants, only infants of modestly controlling mothers interpreted 
the hand reach as directed towards a particular goal. In 10 months old infants however, this 
effect of maternal interaction style does not seem to play a role anymore. Infants within this 
age group showed longer looking times during the object change test event compared to the 
path change test event. Together, this suggests that mother-infant interaction plays a role 
within a certain time span during the social cognitive development. 
Overall, our findings suggest that 9 months old infants are able to interpret a simple 
direct reach movement of a hand as both goal-directed in general and directed to a particular 
goal. Six months old infants however, experienced difficulties in interpreting the simple 
directed reach movement as directed towards a particular goal, even when presented with 
outcome selection information. This may indicate that this simple action does not contain 
sufficient unambiguous means selection information, which is reported as a possible 
explanation for why infants do not make goal-directed action predictions (Luo & Baillargeon, 
2005). However, when presented with a simple reach action which seems to end without 
achieving any goal at all, 6 months old infants are able to make goal-directed action 
predictions when presented with outcome selection information but not when there is a lack of 
information from the situation itself. Our findings may indicate a developmental shift of 
which information is important for infants to interpret daily situations. As indicated by 
Hohenberger et al. (2012), younger infants may rely more on information from observing and 
interacting with their caregivers, because their own goal-directed behavior is not fully 
developed. On a later age however, infants may also rely more on their own experience with 
goal-directed behavior and therefore have more knowledge of how actions can be efficiently 
adjusted to achieve a particular goal. They are able to experiment themselves with goal-
directed behavior they observe. Therefore, they do not need to rely on explicit situational 
choice situations to understand such simple actions, but they may need this kind of 
information when the actions become more complicated. 
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